Trump’s Iran Nuclear Deal: A Contentious Path to Reopening the Strait of Hormuz

The nuclear challenge at the heart – President Donald Trump announced on Saturday that a U.S.-Iran agreement was “scheduled to get signed” by Sunday, though Tehran remains cautious about the timeline. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Baghaei, clarified earlier that the exact signing date would be confirmed, stating, “We will have to wait and see about the exact date of the signing of the memorandum of understanding, although it will not be tomorrow.” Despite these reservations, the deal aims to address key issues, including the potential reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the U.S. lifting its economic sanctions on Iranian shipping. However, the technical specifics of the agreement are still under finalization, with officials emphasizing its broader implications for Iran’s nuclear program.

The proposed deal hinges on the mutual agreement to dismantle parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. While U.S. representatives claim the agreement will lead to the destruction and removal of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles—a vital element in nuclear weapon development—the details remain unclear. This uncertainty has sparked debates about the deal’s effectiveness, particularly in light of its predecessor, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was abandoned by Trump during his first term. The current negotiations are framed as a chance to revive the accord, but with adjustments that reflect the priorities of the new administration.

Uranium, a naturally occurring radioactive element, serves as the foundation of both nuclear energy and weaponry. Its unique properties allow it to fuel power plants, yet it must be “enriched” to become suitable for bomb production. Enrichment involves increasing the concentration of uranium-235, the isotope critical for nuclear reactions. Low-enriched uranium typically contains 3-5% uranium-235, sufficient for reactors, but weapons-grade uranium requires at least 90% enrichment. This distinction underscores the central role of uranium in the nuclear challenge at the heart of the U.S.-Iran talks.

The war in the region, which began on 28 February, has intensified concerns about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Trump has repeatedly asserted that Iran must surrender its stockpiles, declaring on 29 March, “They’re going to give us the nuclear dust.” During an interview with NBC on 7 June, he reiterated this stance, stating, “If we make a deal now we’re friendly, we’ll all go together. It’ll be our equipment. We’ll take it out and destroy it, whether it’s onsite or whether we take it offsite.” These statements highlight Trump’s focus on dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a theme that has dominated the negotiations.

Iran, however, has maintained that “zero enrichment” is a non-negotiable condition. This position reflects its commitment to maintaining the right to enrich uranium as part of its nuclear program. The 2015 JCPOA, which Iran supported, imposed strict limits on its enrichment activities. Under that agreement, Iran was required to reduce its uranium stockpile by 98%, retaining only 300kg (660lbs) of low-enriched uranium. It also agreed to cap enrichment at 3.67% purity and limit centrifuge use, the machines responsible for enriching uranium. These measures were designed to prevent Iran from developing weapons-grade material, ensuring compliance with international nuclear standards.

The Legacy of the 2015 JCPOA

Baroness Catherine Ashton, the lead negotiator for the JCPOA on behalf of the UN Security Council, described the original agreement as a landmark achievement. “The number one issue that was running at that time was whether Iran was going to go for building a nuclear weapon,” she explained to BBC Verify. The Obama administration argued that the JCPOA would prevent Iran from pursuing a secret nuclear program, backed by “extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection” protocols. In return, the U.S. lifted sanctions, including those on oil, trade, and banking, signaling a thaw in diplomatic relations.

Kelsey Davenport, a researcher at the Arms Control Association, praised the JCPOA for its success in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “Any move to nuclear weapons, any deviation from the JCPOA’s terms would have been detected,” she said, noting that both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and U.S. intelligence agencies confirmed Iran’s compliance until the U.S. withdrew from the agreement in 2018. This period of adherence to the deal was seen as a critical moment in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Yet, Trump criticized the JCPOA as a “horrible, one-side deal that should never, ever have been made” during its withdrawal in May 2018. He argued that the agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and left loopholes in its inspection mechanisms. “The inspection requirements lacked mechanisms to prevent, detect, and punish cheating,” Trump claimed, citing Israeli intelligence reports that suggested Tehran’s long-standing pursuit of nuclear weapons. These critiques have fueled the current negotiations, which seek to address perceived shortcomings in the original pact.

Revisiting the Nuclear Arms Race

While the JCPOA focused on Iran’s enrichment activities, Trump’s administration emphasized the need to target its broader nuclear capabilities. The proposed deal, according to officials, aims to restore the balance of power in the region by ensuring Iran’s uranium stockpiles are reduced and its enrichment capacity is limited. However, this approach has drawn criticism from analysts who argue that the JCPOA was already sufficient to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

“All of these issues were completely pushed to the sidelines, completely deprioritised and not included in the arrangement,” said Jacob Olidort, chief research officer at the America First Policy Institute. He contended that the original deal overlooked Iran’s missile program and its strategic nuclear ambitions, leaving the door open for future violations. This perspective contrasts with that of Baroness Ashton, who defended the JCPOA’s comprehensiveness. “There was always a criticism that we should have covered all kind of things,” she said, “but the critical question was, ‘Could we prevent any fear that Iran was going to build a nuclear weapon?’”

The IAEA reported in April 2018 that Iran had been “transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the JCPOA,” according to the U.S. Department of State. This assessment, however, did not align with Trump’s view of the deal as a failure. The withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 marked a significant shift in U.S. policy, with Trump vowing to reimpose sanctions and renegotiate terms that would better serve American interests. The current agreement, he argued, would not only dismantle Iran’s nuclear stockpiles but also restore U.S. leverage in the region.

The implications of the deal extend beyond immediate nuclear constraints. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz—a vital waterway for global oil shipments—could ease tensions and stabilize energy markets. However, the success of the agreement will depend on its ability to maintain Iran’s compliance with enrichment limits while addressing other concerns, such as its missile program and regional influence. The tension between these priorities will likely shape the deal’s long-term viability.

As the negotiations progress, the stakes remain high. The agreement must not only secure Iran’s cooperation in reducing its nuclear capabilities but also reassure the international community that it will not pursue weapons-grade material. The U.S. and Iran will need to navigate these challenges carefully, balancing their strategic goals with the need for mutual trust. The outcome of these talks will determine whether the nuclear challenge at the heart of the negotiations is resolved—or if it becomes a renewed source of conflict.