Bangladesh Courts China Even as Ties with India Improve

Bangladesh courts China even as ties – Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was ousted in August 2024, has been a key figure in India-Bangladesh relations for years. However, her successor, Tarique Rahman, has taken a different path, prioritizing closer economic and strategic partnerships with China while simultaneously working to mend ties with India. During a recent visit to Beijing, Rahman met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, signaling a shift in Dhaka’s foreign policy priorities. This move comes as Bangladesh seeks to attract more foreign investment to stimulate its struggling economy, while also attempting to re-establish diplomatic warmth with its eastern neighbor.

A New Foreign Policy Direction

Rahman’s first overseas official trip in February saw him travel to Malaysia and China, a decision analysts say reflects a deliberate effort to realign Bangladesh’s global alliances. While Malaysia’s visit was symbolic, the focus on China is seen as more strategic. With India traditionally serving as a primary diplomatic destination for South Asian leaders, Rahman’s choice to prioritize Beijing highlights a growing recognition of China’s economic influence in the region. The new government’s emphasis on securing Chinese investments and collaborations, particularly in infrastructure and water management, has drawn significant attention.

Bangladesh’s reliance on China is underscored by its ongoing economic challenges. The country has long been a key partner for India, but Rahman’s administration is now looking to diversify its economic partnerships. Among the agreements discussed with Beijing, efforts to manage the Teesta River and develop a special economic zone near Mongla port have been highlighted. These initiatives are not only economically significant but also politically charged, as they mark a departure from India’s previous dominance in regional diplomacy.

Tensions and Reconciliation

The relationship between Bangladesh and India has faced strain since the 2024 uprising that led to Hasina’s ousting. India, which had supported her government, was perceived by some in Bangladesh as complicit in the political turmoil. This sentiment has fueled anti-India sentiment in Dhaka, particularly over the handling of border disputes and the alleged repatriation of Bengali-speaking Muslims into India. Despite these tensions, both countries have taken steps to ease hostilities in recent months.

Following Rahman’s landslide victory in February, India and Bangladesh began to engage in talks aimed at repairing their bilateral ties. India’s new High Commissioner to Dhaka, Dinesh Trivedi, was recently elevated to cabinet rank, a rare move that signals Delhi’s commitment to strengthening diplomatic and economic cooperation. Meanwhile, passenger bus services between India and Bangladesh have resumed after an 18-month hiatus, operating between Kolkata and Dhaka, as well as Dhaka and Agartala. This partial recovery of cross-border transport is seen as a positive sign for the two nations’ reconciliation.

“There is no doubt there has been a relative relaxation of tensions between the two countries,” said former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran. “The cross-border economic activities are gradually returning to normal and India is also issuing tourist visas to Bangladeshis.”

India’s recent emergency fuel shipments to Bangladesh via the cross-border Friendship Pipeline further demonstrate this thawing. When the Middle East conflict disrupted global fuel supplies earlier this year, Delhi sent thousands of tonnes of oil to support Bangladesh, highlighting the country’s strategic importance in the region. Analysts suggest that these actions are part of a broader effort to reset the relationship, which had been strained during the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus.

Political Shifts and Strategic Balancing

Rahman’s administration has also sought to address lingering grievances with India. While the interim government imposed trade restrictions on India, bilateral trade last year reached approximately £13bn, with India maintaining a clear economic advantage. This has prompted Bangladesh to explore alternatives, including deeper ties with China, to ensure its long-term stability. The Teesta River issue remains a focal point, as Bangladesh’s efforts to negotiate water-sharing agreements with India have stalled for years. Chinese involvement in managing the river is viewed as a sensitive security matter by New Delhi.

Meanwhile, the political landscape in West Bengal has added another layer to the India-Bangladesh dynamic. In May, the Hindu-nationalist BJP defeated the Trinamool Congress, ending its nearly 16-year rule in the Bangladesh-bordering state. This shift has raised concerns in Dhaka, as some fear the BJP’s policies may exacerbate existing tensions. Analysts note that inflammatory remarks by Indian politicians during West Bengal’s state elections have further complicated relations, sending mixed signals to Bangladesh’s leadership.

“All these things got high visibility and created public dissatisfaction in Bangladesh which in a way reflected on Dhaka’s thinking process,” said former Bangladeshi diplomat Humayun Kabir. “The Bangladeshi government didn’t look at these issues or positive indications,” he added.

Bangladesh officials argue that India has been pushing thousands of Bengali-speaking Muslims into the country without proper repatriation processes, a move they view as a humanitarian concern. This has led to ongoing disputes over border management and migration policies. Despite these challenges, Rahman’s government has shown willingness to engage with India on practical matters, such as trade and connectivity, while also securing China’s support for critical infrastructure projects.

The evolving relationship between Bangladesh and India underscores the complex interplay of economic interests, political alliances, and regional security concerns. As Dhaka works to balance its ties with both neighbors, the role of China as a strategic partner is becoming increasingly prominent. However, analysts caution that while progress has been made, underlying issues such as the Teesta River dispute and migration policies remain unresolved. These challenges will likely shape the future trajectory of Bangladesh’s foreign policy, as it navigates a delicate geopolitical landscape.

In the context of global power dynamics, Bangladesh’s dual engagement with China and India reflects a pragmatic approach to securing economic stability and regional influence. The country’s leadership is now focused on leveraging its relationships with both nations to address domestic challenges, while also countering the perception of India’s dominance in the region. As the new administration continues its efforts, the success of its strategy will depend on its ability to maintain momentum in both partnerships, even as old tensions resurface.

The recent initiatives between India and Bangladesh, including the resumption of trade and transport services, suggest a gradual shift toward cooperation. Yet, the lingering anti-India sentiment and the unresolved disputes over border issues indicate that full reconciliation may take time. As the two nations work to rebuild trust, their shared cultural and linguistic ties will remain a key asset in fostering closer relations. The future of Bangladesh’s foreign policy will hinge on its capacity to harmonize these diverse priorities and strengthen its position in the South Asian arena.