Will Starmer’s Plan for Defence Help the UK Hit NATO’s Spending Target?

Will Starmer s plan for defence – The UK government unveiled its long-awaited Defence Investment Plan (DIP) on Tuesday, with Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer describing the additional funding as a “huge historic shift for our nation.” The plan outlines significant commitments to bolster military spending, but the question remains: does it set the UK on a path to meet its NATO spending pledges? BBC Verify has examined the details of the plan and its implications for the country’s defence budget, as well as its alignment with international commitments.

NATO’s Spending Commitments

NATO members have agreed to increase their defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2024 and 2.5% by 2027. However, the alliance’s core defence target—3.5% of GDP—was set for 2035. In June 2025, during a NATO summit in The Hague, the UK joined other nations in pledging to spend 5% of GDP on defence and security by 2035, with 3.5% designated as “core defence” spending. This includes funds for military pensions, critical infrastructure protection, and civil preparedness, which are counted separately under NATO’s qualifying framework.

According to the latest figures, the UK’s NATO-qualifying defence spending reached £70bn in 2025, equivalent to 2.4% of GDP. Starmer has stated that the DIP will push this figure to 2.6% by 2027 and further to 3% “in the next parliament.” These projections are based on the government’s assertion that the new plan will raise defence spending to £270bn over the current parliamentary term, the largest sustained increase since the 1980s. Yet, the plan’s specifics reveal a nuanced picture.

“The measures in the DIP takes us to 4.2% under that commitment,” Starmer claimed, emphasizing the alignment of the UK’s efforts with NATO’s goals.

Details of the Defence Investment Plan

The DIP sets the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) budget at £68.3bn for the 2026-27 fiscal year. However, this figure only reflects the MoD’s direct expenditure, not the broader NATO-qualifying spending. To meet the 2.5% target by 2027, the government must account for additional state funding allocated to areas like military pensions and intelligence operations. These are now classified as part of NATO-qualifying defence spending, according to Starmer’s announcement.

Former Defence Secretary John Healey had previously criticized the DIP, stating that it would only bring NATO-qualifying spending to 2.68% by 2030. He argued that this was inadequate to address current threats and that the UK should aim for 3% by 2030 rather than waiting for the next parliament. The updated plan, however, suggests a slower trajectory. It projects that by 2027-28, defence spending will reach 2.7% of GDP, a figure that remains relatively unchanged through 2030. This implies that the proportion of GDP dedicated to defence is unlikely to rise significantly in the coming years.

Starmer’s team has highlighted the DIP’s “clear ambition” to push spending to 3% by the next parliamentary session, which is expected to begin in 2025. The plan also asserts that the 3.5% core defence target for 2035 will be “met.” But how realistic is this? The current pace of growth appears modest, with the UK’s GDP increasing by just 0.02% annually over the next decade. This small increment would require a cumulative boost of £600m in 2030 to achieve the 2.7% figure, as stated in the plan.

Funding and Projections

The government’s commitment to increase defence spending by £15bn over the current parliamentary term has been a central theme. This figure builds on the £13.5bn proposed in the original DIP, suggesting an additional £1.5bn was secured since John Healey resigned in June 2025. However, some reports indicate a £28bn “shortfall” in the UK’s defence budget, raising questions about how these funds will be allocated.

Healey, who left the cabinet after the DIP was finalized, argued that the government lacked a “clear plan” to reach the 3% target by 2030. He stressed the importance of setting a specific “target date” for this goal, given the evolving security landscape. Despite these concerns, Starmer has maintained that the plan positions the UK on a “trajectory” to meet its aspirations. This trajectory, however, may depend on future spending reviews and the government’s ability to maintain its current pace of investment.

The DIP also outlines how the UK’s security and intelligence activities will contribute to NATO-qualifying spending. By 2027, these operations will be fully integrated into the defence budget, potentially raising the overall proportion. This adjustment reflects a broader strategy to align domestic spending with international standards, but it also highlights the complexity of measuring defence expenditure. For instance, the inclusion of state funding for pensions and infrastructure protection adds layers to the calculation, making it harder to track progress toward the 3.5% core defence target.

Historical Context and Future Challenges

Starmer has frequently emphasized that the current defence spending plan represents a historic shift, citing the £270bn total over the four-year period from 2025 to 2028. This figure is derived from the 2025 Spending Review, which established the baseline for MoD funding. The DIP, by adding £15bn more, aims to accelerate this growth. Yet, the plan’s projection of 2.7% GDP spending by 2030 suggests a slower rate of increase compared to the 3% goal.

Analysts are divided on whether the UK can realistically achieve its 2035 target. While the government claims the DIP sets the stage for this, the 2.7% figure by 2030 may not be sufficient to meet the 3.5% requirement. The challenge lies in the timing of future spending reviews and the flexibility to adjust allocations. For example, if the next review introduces new priorities or unexpected costs, the trajectory could shift.

Additionally, the £28bn shortfall reported in the defence budget adds pressure to the government’s commitments. This gap could be addressed through increased taxation, budget reallocations, or supplementary funding. The DIP, however, does not provide detailed year-by-year breakdowns for 2030 and beyond, leaving room for interpretation. Without more transparency, it is difficult to assess whether the plan will hold up to scrutiny.

Despite these uncertainties, Starmer’s vision for defence spending remains ambitious. The plan underscores the UK’s dedication to NATO’s objectives, even as it navigates domestic fiscal constraints. The success of this strategy will depend on the government’s ability to balance immediate security needs with long-term commitments. For now, the DIP appears to be a step forward, but whether it ensures the UK meets its 2035 target remains to be seen.

Key Takeaways and Questions

While the DIP marks a notable step in the UK’s defence strategy, it also raises several critical questions. First, is the 2.7% GDP target by 2030 a solid foundation for achieving 3% in the next parliament, or is it a temporary measure? Second, how will the inclusion of intelligence and pension spending affect the overall budget, and is this integration realistic? Third, what role will future spending reviews play in maintaining momentum toward the 3.5% core defence target by 2035?

Ultimately, the UK’s ability to hit its NATO spending goals hinges on the consistency of its financial commitments. The DIP provides a roadmap, but its effectiveness will be tested by the government’s capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. As Starmer reiterated, the plan is designed to position the UK for success. However, the journey to 3% and beyond will require sustained effort and strategic planning, especially in the face of economic and geopolitical challenges.

With the DIP now in place, the focus shifts to implementation. The next phase of defence spending will determine whether the UK can meet its commitments—or whether it will need to revise its targets. For now, the plan offers a vision of growth, but its execution will be the real test of its impact on national security and international obligations.